Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Nanjing Campaign According to Officers' testimony (1) April 1984 review

The editor of this Nanjing Campaign history is Unemoto Masami, graduated from officers school of IJA, Class of 46th.  He used to be a professor at University of Defense.  When he wrote this, he was in 70s, and had long been retired as a farmer.

The background of this history was textbook conflict: China protested that Japanese government was water downing  history text books, which they were not (the initial newspaper article that provoked Chinese response was false, or fabrication).  But any how, Nanjing incident was brought into Japanese and global attention again in 80s, because of this.  Actually, PRC began to build monuments of Nanjing incident in the city in 1980s.  The museum was opened in 1985.

PRC claims that more than 300,000 civilians were slaughtered in Nanjing after the fall of Nanjing in December 1937 and  during early 1938.  Tokyo Tribunal after the war ruled that the victims were slightly lower number, 150,000 to 200,000.  The natural feeling of officers, including Unemoto, who participated in the campaign was that the numbers were too large to be believable.  Since IJA burned down most of the military documents immediately before the surrender, there are not many official documents left.  Since Japanese government has never contested the ruling of Tokyo Tribunal, and probably never will, the officers decided to find out what really happened by the testimonies of the veterans of the campaign.

Nanjing Campaign was a large military attack after the fall of Shanghai.  The battle was quick and swift, involving 16th and 9th divisions and 10th regiment (11th division) of Shanghai expeditionary army; 114th, 6th, and 18th divisions of 10th army; 41th regiment; the third fleet of Navy; and army air force.

The decision to attack Nanjing was made on December 1, and Nanjing fell on December 13, 1937.

This section describes:
1. The battle in the cities between Shanghai and Nanjing was fierce.  Chinese army often used machine guns from concrete bunkers.  The cities were seriously destroyed when Chinese army resisted.  When Japanese army occupied the city, they were usually barren and nobody was in sight except dead soldiers.
2. In contrast, Suzhou surrendered without fight and the destruction was minimal.
3. Chinese army destroyed, burned and looted cities before they retreated so as not to leave anything valuable to Japanese army (Empty the house and clean the field strategy).
4. Chinese army resorted to guerrilla tactics.
5. Logistics of Japanese army was not so difficult.

Two other things:
1. Who decided the Nanjing campaign?
At the end of November 1937, the battle of Shanghai was over.
It was the army at Shanghai (probably meaning Matsui Iwane), and Shimomura Sadamu, the director of 1st division of Chief of Staffs.  The campaign was well prepared.
2. Negotiation with Chang Kaishek through Trautmann
This section stresses Japanese government (Hirota Koki, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Yoneuchi Mitsumasa, Minister of Navy) decided to discontinue the peace negotiation with KMT through Trautmann, and the military backed off.  This led to the declaration by the Japanese government that Japan no longer negotiates with KMT government.

The officers condemns the action of the government that resulted in the protracted war.  Chiang Kaishek had already decided to resort to total war long before the fall of Nanjing.  His plan was to lure Japanese army to machine guns in concrete bunkers (Seeckt line), prepared around Shanghai by Germans.

Chiang Kaishek's failure was that he had no option when Seeckt line was crossed by Japanese army.  In the end, the only chance of peace was right after the fall of Nanjing.  The government should have used the every opportunity to cease fire.

The government was even more naive to believe Germans were neutral third party, when they were actively helping KMT in the very war.  Germans and Hitler changed their pro-China policy in mid-1938 and became pro-Japan, resulting in the anti-communism pact.  Germans broke the pact and allies with Soviet (Molotov-Ribbentrop pact), which led to the collapse of Hiranuma cabinet, commenting that the situations in Europe was too mysterious.

Monday, February 22, 2010

Nanjing Campaign According to Officers' testimony (1) April 1984

In April 1984, Kaiko sha (the organization of IJA officers) started to publish the compiled records of officers who participated in Nanjing campaign in 1937, after the second battle of Shanghai.  I would be happy if you can have an idea of what was going on on the fateful month of December.

Except for the format change to suit the web, the text is the same as the original.
===
証言による『南京戦史』
46期 畝本正巳

(会員諸賢に)
「偕行」編集部

いわゆる「南京事件』に関する情報の提供について会員各位から多くのご援助をいただいたことを重ねて厚く御礼申し上げます。

畝本正巳君の研究が逐次編集部に到着する運びになりましたので、今月号から掲載を始めます。

題して「証言による南京戦史」。これは、文字通り、真相を知る参戦者の体験を主軸としてまとめあげた「戦史」であります。参戦部隊の作戦行動の基本は確実な戦史史料に根拠を求め、できる限り部隊の戦闘行動を細かく追うて、この間に「何がおこなわれたのか」を明らかにしようとするものであります。関係部隊の行動の細部を明らかにする公的な史料は、残念ながら充分には存在しません。これを補う途として、従軍者の証言によったわけであります。

畝本君は長期に亘る自身の研究の上に、会員各位はもとより部外の多くの方々からの指摘や資料を得て、ここにこの事件の全容を纏め上げられました。

その研究はまず南京攻略戦の全貌を描き、この作戦・戦闘の特異性ともいうべき事象を明らかにし、ついで何時、何処で、どんな戦闘が行われたか、個々の事象を分析しつつ、組み立て綜合して南京で何が行われたかを明らかにする手法をとっています。

今日、この事件について多くのことが指摘され、非難もされていますが、肝心の日本軍の側から、この事件の全貌を綜合研究したものが皆無であることを考えると、この論稿がこの事件を論ずる資料として、信頼するのに足る戦史書であることを確信し、期待しているわけであります。

この事件は今後も内外でいろいろに論ぜられるものと思いますが、その場合にこの戦史が根拠ある資料として活用されることを祈ってやみません。

われわれの立場は、昨年11月号の「偕行」誌上で明らかにした通り、実際に何が行われたにせよ、当時の従軍者が日々に少なくなる現状において、今にしてその真相を探るのでなくては、ついにその究明の時期を失するのではないか、との考えからであります。

従軍者の証言を基盤とするこの「戦史」は今後もさらに多くの証言を得られることを期待しています。畝本君の研究によって記憶を新たにされた方々の御協力を、この上ともにお願いいたします。(42加登川 記)



いわゆる南京事件は一昨年、教科書検定に関連して「大虐殺」が行われたとして問題とされた。事件は上海戦につづく、約二百マイルの追撃戦の終末期、首都・南京の攻防の過程において生じたとされる。したがって、南京事件の真相は、南京攻略戦の経過、特にその戦闘の細部の実態を究明することによってのみ、初めて明らかにされる、これがため、防衛研究所戦史部署「支那事変・陸軍作戦(1)」および戦闘参加各師団・聯隊史を踏まえ、当時の参加者の生の証言の為し得る限りを収集比較検討して、果たして南京で何が行われたか、南京入場時の実態を探ってみたい。

一、上海より南京へ

1、追撃作戦の統制
昭和12年8月以来、悪戦苦闘をつづけた上海派遣軍は、11月5日の第十軍(柳川平助中将)の杭州湾上陸および第十六師団の白茆口上陸により戦況は一挙に好転し、11月下旬、蘇州~嘉興の作戦制令線に殺到した。当時、参謀本部内においては、制令線を撤廃して、軍を進むべきや否やが問題となったが、第十軍の「一挙追撃ヲ敢行シテ南京ヲ占領スベキ」積極案にひきずられて、中支那方面軍がこれに追随し、中央部が追認する形をとって作戦は進行していった。そして、11月24日、方面軍は無錫~湖州の線においてその後の作戦準備を命じた。潰走する敵を急追して常州、丹陽、金壇に前進拠点をつくり、主力は無錫~湖州の線以東の地区で、12月上旬までに南京に向かう準備を整えた。第十軍は嘉興~湖州~長興を経て、第百十四師団は一部をもって宜興・漂陽を、第十八師団の追撃隊および国崎支隊は広徳に進出し、軍主力はその後方地区に集結した。

このように軍中央部は、事変処理の政略的要求を重く考えて作戦を統制したが、現地軍とくに最前線の追撃部隊は、徹底的に破壊された橋梁や道路を修復しつつ、昼夜兼行の進撃をつづけたのである。

2、南京攻略作戦の発動
南京攻略を行うか、否かは、政略的配慮があり政府・参謀本部で種々論議されたが、現地軍の再三にわたる意見具申、さらに参謀本部下村定第一部長の熱心な意見具申によりついに「南京攻略」が決定された。そして12月1日、大陸命第七号により中支那方面軍の戦闘序列が下命され、方面軍司令官松井石根大将、上海派遣軍司令官朝香宮鳩彦王中将、第十軍司令官柳川平助中将の陣容をもって、大陸命第八号をもって「海軍ト協同シテ敵国首都南京ヲ攻略スル」こととなった。

方面軍は、1日、南京攻略作戦の命令を下達し、隷下両軍を次のように部処した。
一、上海派遣軍は12月5日頃主力ノ行動ヲ開始シテ、重点ヲ丹陽、句容道方面ニ保持シ、当面ノ敵ヲ撃破シテ磨盤山山系西方地区ニ進出スベシ。一部ハ揚子江左岸地区ヨリ敵ノ背後ヲ攻撃スルト共ニ、津浦鉄道及ビ江北大運河ヲ遮断セシムベシ。
二、第十軍は12月3日頃、主力ノ行動ヲ起シ、一部ヲモツテ蕪湖方面ヨリ南京ノ背後ニ進出セシメ、主力ヲ以テ当面ノ敵ヲ撃破シ漂水附近ニ進出スベシ。特ニ杭州方面ニ対シ警戒スベシ。
この命令は、一挙に南京に向かい追撃するのではなく、南京要塞の抵抗、部隊の態勢整理などを考えて、まず磨盤山山系西方ー漂水附近に進出して、南京攻略を準備しようとするものであった。

3、トラウトマン工作
日本政府および軍中央部は、支那事変勃発以来、不拡大・現地解決方針のもとに、日・支両当事国による直接交渉を建前として早期解決の途を模索しつづけた。

しかし、事変が逐次拡大するにともない、石原第一部長~ドイツ大使館付武官オット少将~駐支ドイツ大使トラウトマンのルート、および広田外相~駐日ドイツ大使ディルクセン~トラウトマン駐支大使のルートを通じて、和平交渉を開始した。そして11月6日、ディルクセン大使は日本側の交渉条件を、ドラウトマンを通じて蒋介石に提示した。蒋介石はこれを拒否したが、情勢はなお流動的であった。

その後、蒋介石も期待を寄せていたブリュッセルの九ヶ国条約会議が不調に終わるや、改めてトラウトマン工作に期待を寄せはじめた。12月2日の南京におけるトラウトマン大使との会談においては、和平交渉に真剣で乗り気であったことは明らかである。

しかるに、南京攻略作戦の進展にともない、日本側が要求する和平交渉の条件は次第に変化し12月13日南京が陥落するに及び日本政府の態度は硬化した。一方、漢口に移転した蒋介石は、この屈辱的和平条件を受け入れること能わず、回答を遷延し、翌13年1月14日に至ってディルクセン大使を通じて、「日本側要求の詳細を知りたい」との回答をようやく寄せたのであるが、わが大本営政府連絡会議は、「中国側に和平の誠意なし」として交渉打切りを決定し、16日、かの有名な「国民政府を相手とせず」の政府声明が発表されたのである。

このトラウトマン工作が流産したことは痛恨の極みであるが、支那事変間で最も微妙かつ重要なこの外交交渉は、南京戦と深く関わっていたのである。
(注)「国民政府を相手にせず」の重大な生命を発するに至った1月15日の大本営政府連絡会議における討論について公刊戦史(支那事変陸軍作戦(1))に次のような興味ある記述がある。
13年1月14日午後の閣議中、16時半ごろ、ディルクセン大使が広田外相を来訪し中国側の回答文(英文)を手交した上「中国側は日本の要求する細目が知りたいとのことであるが、在支独大使は、貴大臣から承った日本側の条件の内容は、大体中国側に伝えたものと思う。しかし別に書き物をもって示したのではないから、この際、日本側の細目条件十一項を書面にしたため、中国側に手交することとすれば、今月20日か21日ごろまでには中国側の確答が得られるであろうと思われるが貴見はどうか」と尋ねた。
これに対し外相は「中国側の回答文は、いかにも日本側が中国側に和を請うたような書きぶりをしている。そもそも抗wの希望及び条件等は、進んで中国側から提示するべき筋合いであるのに、日本側の条件内容を大体承知しながら、なお中国側の意見を示さず、しかも日本側の条件につき説明を求めるのは、和平の誠意がなく、遷延策を講じておるものと考える外ない。目下、閣議の開催中なので、閣議に諮り追って回答をする」旨を答えた。
外相は、直ちに閣議の席にもどり意見を求めたところ、「予定のとおり国民政府を相手とせずとの声明をなし、次のステップに入るべきこと」に意見が一致した。
しかし、これを聞いた大本営は反対し連絡会議の開催を要求した。
15日の大本営政府連絡会議 中国側の回答に接し、日本の態度を決定するため、15日9時半から連絡会議が開かれた。まず外相から日支和平交渉の経緯を説明したのち討議に入ったが、中国側の誠意の有無が論議の焦点となった。政府側は、記述の理由から誠意なしと断じ、交渉打ち切りを主張し、陸海統帥部は、いま交渉を打ち切るのは尚早であるとした。
閑院宮参謀総長は、交渉条件細目十一ヶ条が確実につたわっているかどうか疑問であるので、短期間の期限を付して今一度確かめてはどうかと強調した。多田参謀次長はこの回答文をもって脈なしと断定せず、脈あるように図るべきである。わずかの期日を争い、挙国的決意も準備も不十分のまま前途暗澹たる長期戦に移行することが、いかに重大かつ困難であるかを述べ、また、許世英駐日大使を通ずるか、その他の手段をもって中国側の真意を探る方策などを提案して、今直ちに交渉を打ち切ることに反対した。軍令部総長、同次長も、ほぼ同様の意見を述べた。
これに対し、政府側は、交渉を打ち切り、わが態度を明確にすべきだと論じて譲らず、午前の会議を終了した。
午後は15時から再び会議を開いたが、(両総長は出席せず)政府と大本営は完全に対立し、従って軍内においても杉山大臣と多田次長との意見が激しく対立した。陸相は「期限までに諾否の返電がないのは和平の誠意がない証左である、蒋介石を相手とせず屈服するまで作戦を進めるべきである」と主張し、広田外相は「永い外交官生活の経験に照らし、中国側の応酬ぶりは和平解決の誠意がないことはあきらかである。参謀次長は外務大臣を信用しないのか」と述べ、米内海相は「政府は外務大臣を信頼する。統帥部が外務大臣を信用せぬは同時に政府不信任である。政府は辞職のほかない」と詰め寄った。
夕刻、参謀次長は参謀本部に帰り、首脳会議を開いて協議し、軍令部とも調整した結果、夜19時半からの連絡会議において「蒋政権否認を本日の会議で決定するのは時期尚早であり、統帥部としては不同意であるが、政府崩壊が内外に及ぼす悪影響を認め、黙過してあえて反対を唱えないということに譲歩した。<編集委員>
4、南京攻略態勢整う
上海派遣軍は、隷下各師団に対し、進撃路と前進目標を示した。第十六師団は丹陽ー句容ー湯水鎮ー南京道を南京に、第九師団は金壇ー天王寺ー淳化鎮ー南京道を南京に向かい追撃した。天谷支隊(第十一師団の歩兵第十旅団を基幹とする)は常州ー丹陽ー鎮江道を鎮江に、第十三師団は一部をもって靖江、主力をもって江陰ー常州ー鎮江に向かい追撃し、揚子江北岸作戦を準備した。

第十軍は、第百十四師団が漂陽ー漂水ー秣陵関道を、第六師団が広徳ー郎渓ー東善橋道を、ともに南京に、第十八師団は広徳ー寧国ー蕪湖ー南京道を南京に向かい追撃した。

また、国崎支隊(歩兵第四十一聯隊基幹)は、広徳ー郎渓ー太平道を前進し、太平付近で揚子江を渡河し、浦口付近に進出して敵の退路を遮断するように部署された。

そして12月4日、松井方面軍司令官は、「南京郊外の既設陣地を奪取し、南京城の攻略を準備する」に決し、両軍の南京攻撃準備線を、おおむね上元門ー小衙ー高橋門ー雨花台ー棉花地の線に統制したのである。上海派遣軍方面においては、第十六師団、第九師団の追撃隊は、それぞれ、12月8日には湯水鎮および淳化鎮付近に進出し、天谷支隊は12月8日、鎮江砲台を占領した。

第十軍方面においては、第百十四師団は、12月7日、秣陵関付近に進出し、第六師団は、12月8日から第百十四師団の左翼に進出して、敵陣地の攻撃に参加した。第十八師団主力は、抵抗する敵を撃破しながら前進し、12月7日、寧国を占領し、国崎支隊は水上機動を利用しつつ、太平に向かい前進をつづけた。

5、海軍及び陸軍航空部隊の活動
11月中旬以来、第三艦隊は中支沿岸水域の航行遮断、占領水域の警戒および敵航空勢力の覆滅に任じ、中国政府の財政に打撃を与え戦力の培養を阻止した。また、揚子江溯航の第十一戦隊(司令官近藤英次郎少将、旗艦「安宅」)は、揚子江の掃海、航路の啓開、わが輸送船の嚮導、敵陸上砲台の制圧などの任務をもって、陸上部隊の進撃に呼応して溯航作戦を進めた。

中支方面に対する海軍航空作戦は、8月上旬以来、上海付近の制空権獲得と地上作戦に協力したが、9月下旬から南京付近を襲撃するほか、広東、漢口を空襲して中・南支の制空権を獲得した。また、揚子江上の支那艦艇に対する作戦においては、10月上旬までにその大部を撃沈または擱座させた。さらに、南京に対する追撃戦においては、主力をあげて敵の退路上の要地および敵部隊を爆撃して、陸上作戦に密接に協力した。

上海派遣軍に配属された第三飛行団は、当初、公大飛行場、王浜飛行場(呉淞西方約四粁)を根拠飛行場として、第一線兵団の攻撃および杭州湾上陸作戦に協力した。南京攻略戦においては、主力をもって第十軍に協力して王浜および竜華飛行場として、敵陣地の偵察、弾薬糧秣の空中輸送、南京飛行場、同城壁の爆撃等を実施して第一線兵団に協力した。

とくに、揚子江上を遡江する敵大部隊、蕪湖付近から南方に後退する敵、あるいは寧国を経て南方に退却する部隊を攻撃して多大な損害を与えた。

6、追撃作戦の実態
中支那方面軍は8月以来、約四ヶ月にわたる昼夜をわかたぬ凄絶な激戦に引き続いて、南京に向かって追撃を開始したが、第一線追撃隊は無統制になだれを打って南京に殺到したのではない。蘇州ー嘉興の線、つづいて無錫ー湖州の線で進撃を統制され、12月1日「南京攻略」決定後においても、一挙に南京に押し寄せるのではなく、南京を去る約四十キロの磨盤山山系西方ー漂水の線で態勢をととのえ、南京攻略を準備したのである。

各部隊は数少ない主要な道路に沿って進撃したが、太湖周辺の江南平野は、「南船北馬」の古諺のように、到るところにクリークがあり全く「クリークとの戦い」であった。このクリークの橋は全部破壊消却され、道路以外はほとんど水田地帯である。一本の進撃路に歩兵、砲兵、輜重隊、自動車隊が蜩集し、我れ先きにと戦陣を争うのであるから、その混雑、渋滞は想像以上のものであった。

都市の攻防と破壊 中国軍はわが進撃路上の重要都市で頑強に抵抗した。太湖以北では、福山、常熟、呉山、江陰、泗安、広徳などでは、城壁に拠る敵と激戦を交えた。わが陸海の航空部隊は爆撃をくりかえし、砲撃を加えたので、抵抗した都市の破壊は甚大であった。

わが中隊(独立軽装甲車第二中隊・畝本はその小隊長であった)は11月25日、激戦の末湖州に入城したが、人ッ子一人居ない荒廃した街となり、市内は掠奪されており、あちこちに硝煙がくすぶっていたので、郊外の草地を選んで車営(車輛の中で寝る)した。また、11月30日正午過ぎ第一線の歩兵に続いて広徳に入城したが、市街はわが砲爆撃によって破壊され、あちこちに火災を発生して家は荒らされており、敵の遺棄屍体が散乱していた。逃げ遅れた敗残兵が右往左往していたが、一般住民は居なかった。ここでも火災を恐れて郊外の池のほとりで露営したが、歩兵部隊は焼失を免れた民家を探し求め宿営した。

湖北平野の常熟ー無錫ー江陰ー常州道を進撃した独立軽装甲車第七中隊の戦記は、激戦の模様を次のように述べている。
11月16日、友軍主力は「常熟」に肉迫した。第十六師団の助川、野田の各部隊は正面より、第十三師団の永津、佐藤、高橋の各部隊は北方から、豪雨の泥の中を行軍し、常熟の背後をおそったのである。中国軍の精鋭は、敗退の浮足をここでくいとめようとして、トーチカによって頑強に抵抗した。敵の砲弾は火炎を吹いて唸り機銃は鳴り、友軍の陣地は砂煙と硝煙にくもり見通しもつかない。わが負傷者は担架に乗せられて、次から次へと後方に送られ傷兵輸送車は後方に走って行く。わが砲兵の射撃と荒鷲の猛爆はくりかえされ、小気味よい程である。わが中隊は豪雨も、砲弾も縦断も押しのけて常熟に迫り、惨憺たる場内でうろたえまわる敗残兵を掃蕩した。…中略…
「無錫」は江陰砲台に連なる南京防衛の生命線である。ベトンのトーチカ、掩蓋陣地、鉄条網などを配置し、中央軍三ヶ師を配備して頑強に抵抗した。督戦隊や、新鋭の砲兵部隊までくり出して、死に物狂いの抵抗をつづけ、敵ながら天晴れの奮戦ぶりであった。
この無錫の戦闘においては、11月26日、歩兵第十九旅団の第一歩兵大隊の戦闘に協力して、本道上より無錫に突入した。無錫の城壁に近接するや、敵は銃眼から一斉に射撃を開始し、手榴弾を投擲してわが前進を阻止した。中隊は直ちに停止して一斉に射撃を開始し、敵を制圧して敵の背後に迫ることができた。
我々の不意の現出と迅速な突進により周章狼狽した敵は、陣地を撤し家屋より逃げ出して本道上を遁走しはじめた。中隊は射撃と突進をくりかえし、敵を蹴散らしながら追撃して無錫西端、梅園付近に進出した。この戦闘で敵の地雷にかかり跳ね飛ばされた小隊長車と後方に連絡せんとした伝令車は運転不能に陥り、敵の肉迫攻撃をうけて炎上し壮烈な戦死をとげたのである。
日本軍の進撃作戦は各方面とも、このような戦闘をくり返したと思うが、敵が抵抗した都市、村落は甚大な被害を受けたのである。しかし、日本軍は一地に長く駐留することはなく、まして掠奪、暴行の如きを行ったことはない。長くても2~3日、殆どが停止することなく、風の如くに通過したのである。巷間、江南平野二百マイルの追撃作戦において、日本軍が暴虐の限りをつくし、中国住民に莫大な戦禍を与えたかのように宣伝されているが、都市の戦禍は彼我の攻防戦によって生じたものである。日本軍のみの故意のものでないことは明らかである。

蘇州の無血占領 敵が城壁によって抵抗した都市・村落は、彼我の戦闘、中国軍退却時の「焼光作戦」(家を焼きはらい敵に利用させないようにする)により破壊焼失したが、無抵抗の城市は無傷のまま占領されたのである。当時の上海派遣軍参謀、大西一氏36期は蘇州の「無血占領」について次のように述懐している。
上海派遣軍が南京に向かい追撃作戦を開始し戦闘司令所を常熟に進めた時、飛行機の通信筒投下により次の状況を知った。
「第九師団は湖沼地帯を突破して蘇州に近づいている。蘇州にはなお相当の住民が残留している模様」。
松井大将は私に対して、”貴官は直ちに蘇州に急行して、蘇州の文化と住民を守れ”と命ぜられた。
夕日が漸く西に傾き、戦場には傷ついた馬が二、三頭たたずんでいるのを見ながら、将校一名、下士官二名を連れて蘇州に急行した。蘇州に着いてみると、第九師団主力はまだ到着していない。場内を一巡すると、古いお寺のような建物があちらこちらにあり、郊外には有名な寒山寺もある。
「文化を守れ」と言われたが、これを焼かないようにするためには、日本軍を城内に入れないことであると考え、
「日本軍の入城を禁ず 上海派遣軍司令官、陸軍大将松井石根」
と大書して各城門に掲示した。日本軍が入城して休憩すれば、焚火をし、出発の際に火の始末が悪いと火事を起こすことが間々あるのでこの措置をとったのである。
しばらくして第九師団司令部が到着したが、同期生の小西(健雄)参謀がいたので、松井大将の意向を話したら”わかった”と言って城内に入らず前進をつづけた。翌日、軍司令部が到着し、場外に司令部を置いた。
私は松井大将に報告したが、大将はニッコリと笑って私の措置を是認されたのである。
このように蘇州においては一軒の民家も焼かれず、治安も良好で逃走していた住民も逐次復帰し、行政も順調に進んだ。蘇州の治安維持会長であった陳則民氏は、その後、南京に成立した威信政府の教育部長に就任し、たびたび特務機関に来られて蘇州の話をされたものである。
支那軍による掠奪 (歩兵第十九旅団司令部通信班長、犬飼総一郎氏談)
南京に向かう追撃作戦で、京都の第十六師団は江南大運河に沿い進撃したが、その追撃隊となった歩兵第十九旅団(歩兵第九聯隊第三大隊、歩兵第二十聯隊を基幹とする)は11月25日、無錫を突破し、29日には常州に進出した。
無錫も常州も掠奪の跡歴然たるものがあり、私はこの時はじめて、支那軍による掠奪の凄まじさを見たのである。


また、旅団長草場辰巳少将20期は、北支、隆平県城における支那軍の掠奪について、次のように述べている。
第十六師団が転身から子牙河沿いに西南進した作戦末期のことである。児玉支隊が10月13日未明、隆平県城の城壁上に取りつき夜が明けてみると、城内は敗残兵による掠奪で阿鼻叫喚のの街と化していた。
日本軍は、ただ呆ッ気にとられて、しばし茫然としてこの地獄図を城壁から眺めていたのである。
隆平県城内になだれ込んだ敗残兵は、住民から衣・食を奪って便衣化し、明け方になって逃げ出す算段であったのだろう。城壁がすでに日本軍に占領されたのも知らず、掠奪の大狂乱を演じていたのである。
中国における過去の国内戦、各地に割拠する軍閥抗争の歴史をみると、このような掠奪・放火・殺人は常套手段として発生している。支那軍によって、やぶれかぶれの掠奪・破壊が行われたことは明らかである。

便衣の敗残兵の出没 日本軍は主要な道路に沿って、敵の抵抗を排除しながら進撃したから、逃げ遅れた支那軍は道路を離れて周辺の村落に潜入し、便衣に化けて出没し、後方部隊を襲撃した。

奥秋国造氏(独立軽装甲車第二中隊上等兵)は、次のように述べている。
南京に向かう追撃間、設営準備のため、道路から離れたある部落の偵察を命じられた。私たちは一民家の屋内に入ろうとした途端、奥の方に数人の敗残兵がいたらしい。手榴弾を投げて死に物狂いで射撃してきた。
私たちは退避して危うく何を逃れ、中隊段列の増援を得て、この民家を焼き打ちにした。敗残兵は逃げ出す。これを我々は射撃する。屋内にあった銃弾がパンパンと音をたてて近寄れない。この民家は一晩中燃えつづけた。(筆者注・これは湖州の戦闘の時のことである。)
また、わが独立軽装甲車第二中隊が広徳入城の翌日、12月1日、兵站自動車の亀谷部隊が、広徳に進入すべく下泗安附近を夜間前進中、道路阻絶にあい停止して啓開作業中、敗残兵約四百名の襲撃をうけた。わが中隊は二ヶ小隊を派遣して救援に向かったが、敵は退避した後であり、二十四輛の自動車が黒焦げに焼かれ、小隊長以下十名戦死、十数名負傷という惨状を呈していた。

日本軍は主要進撃路以外には、敗敵を深追いしなかったので、広い田園地帯の村落、山中に逃走した敗残兵は、その後便衣で出没し、ゲリラ化して後方部隊を襲撃し、日本軍を悩ませた。

不如意の補給・給養 上海ー南京間約二百里を概ね三十日間で進撃した(追撃発起11月11日前後、南京占領12月13日)。したがって、一日の行程は平均七里であり、当時の軍兵站の常識からみれば、第一線への補給追随が困難な作戦ではなかった。

試みに当時の弾薬・糧秣の携行定量をみてみたい。各兵士は非常用の携行口糧三日分(乾パンと米、固形調味料とカン詰)を持っていたが、この携行口糧は後方から補給杜絶した非常の場合、指揮官の命令によらなければ使用できなかった。

歩兵聯・大隊には大行李(糧食一日分)、小行李(弾薬)があり、師団輜重兵聯隊は通常六ヶ中隊で、歩兵弾薬二ヶ中隊、砲兵弾薬二ヶ中隊、糧秣二ヶ中隊(二日分)に編成されていたので、師団では七日分の糧秣を携行していたことになる。

さらに、第一線師団への常続補給をつづけるために、軍には兵站自動車中隊が配属され、上陸基地には兵站補給諸廠の支廠が設けられ日本本土と補給線をつないでいた。

巷間、「南京事件においては補給・給養が不十分で将兵が鬼獣化して掠奪・暴行の限りをつくした」と称されるので、補給・給養の実情について述べてみたい。

第十方面においては、杭州湾が遠浅のため車輛部隊の揚陸が困難であったので、これらの部隊は上海に回航して同地に上陸し待機した。軍が追撃作戦に移ると、これらの部隊は上海市外北郊を経て松江を渡り、嘉善ー湖州ー広徳・長興へと一本の幹線道路を追及したが、クリーク地帯で道路が少なく、この道路に戦列部隊、さらに後方兵站自動車が蝟集したので、適時、最前線部隊に補給できない状況が続いていた。

私の中隊は常に最先頭の追撃隊に協力しつつ追撃したが、車輛部隊であるので各戦闘車には弾薬一箱と食糧(米)を増加積載していた。戦闘中、夜に入れば、後方の段列が炊飯をして第一線戦闘車まで徒歩で補給してくれるので、このような状態を繰り返して進撃した。

ただ困ったことは、調味品の醤油、塩の欠乏とガソリンの補給であった。幸いにも泗安(広徳東郊の飛行場)でドイツ製ガソリン多量にろ獲したので、このガソリンにより進撃をつづけることができた。

また、軍の作戦制令線である無錫ー湖州の線、丹陽ー漂陽ー広徳の線で、二、三日駐留したので、この間に軍兵站部隊から補給・給養をうけ、戦力を回復することができた。

第十六師団方面 11月13日、白茆口に上陸した第十六師団の、12月1日侍従武官に対する状況報告は、追撃作戦の実態とくに補給・給養の状況をうかがうことができるので、その概要を転記する。
作戦経過ノ概要 
第十六師団ハ数船隊トナリ11月12日呉淞沖ニ達シ、13日払暁、白茆口附近ニ上陸シ、一部ヲ以テ白茆口附近ヲ占領シ、主力ヲ以テ支塘鎮ニ向ヒ前進スベキ軍命令ヲ受領ス。
師団ハ重藤支隊ニ引続キ13日、第一船隊タル歩兵第三十旅団(第三十八聯隊欠)ヲ基幹トセルモノヲ以テ佐々木支隊トシ、揚子江岸ニ上陸シテ、速ヤカニ支塘鎮ー常熟道ニ進出シ敵ノ退路ヲ遮断セシム。佐々木支隊ハ、退却援護ニ任ズル四、五千ノ敵ヲ撃破シ、夜間追撃ヲ続行シテ15日常熟東方約四粁メートル附近ニ進出シ、「トーチカ」ヲ有スル既設陣地ニ拠ル敵ト相対ス。
上陸地点ヨリ戦場ニ至ル間、車輛ヲ通ズル道路ナク、加フルニ連日ノ降雨ノタメ泥濘ノ悪路ト化シ、部隊ノ進出意ノ如クナラズ。コノ頃、師団砲兵全ク参加ノ見込ナク第十一師団及ビ軍砲兵ノ協力ヲ得テ本攻撃ヲ実行セリ。(中略)
19日夜半、敵ノ退却ニ尾シテ、第一線各隊ハ夜間追撃ヲ敢行シ、当面ノ敵ヲ駆逐シテ、22日夕、東亭鎮(無錫東方)ニ進出ス、当時師団ハ歩兵部隊ハ之ヲ集結シ得タルモ砲兵ハ僅カニ四門到着シタルニ過ギス、後方補充機関ハ未ダ上陸ヲ完了セズ。(中略)
東亭鎮附近ノ「トーチカ」ヲ有スル既設陣地ヲ昼夜兼行デ攻撃シ、26日午後二時三十分、完全ニ無錫ヲ占領セリ。師団ハ直ニ草場少将ノ指揮スル歩兵三大隊、軽戦車隊、野砲兵一大隊トシ、京滬鉄道ニ沿フ地区ヲ常州ニ向ヒ追撃セシム。
追撃隊ハ各方面ヨリ退却シ無錫市内ニ充満セル敵ヲ掃蕩シ、或ハ潰走中ノ敵ニ多大ノ損害ヲ与ヘツツ追撃シ、続イテ丹陽ニ向ヒ追撃中、師団主力ハ11月30日常州ニ進入セリ。
師団ノ大部ハ既ニ集結シ得タルモ、騎兵第二十聯隊、野砲兵第二十二聯隊ノ三中隊、大隊段列ノ主力及ビ聯隊段列、輜重兵第十六聯隊、野戦病院ハ尚船上ニ在リ、又各隊大行李ノ主力ハ、或ハ船上、或ハ揚陸地ニ在リテ未ダ集結ノ見込立タズ。
経 理
師団上陸以降ノ給養ハ、主トシテ現地物資ニ依リ、調味品及ビ副食等ノ一部ハ追送ヲ仰ギタルモ、幸ニ江蘇省特産ノ米ヲ各地ニテ得ラルルタメ、比較的良好ナル給養ヲ実施セリ。
師団ノ大行李及ヒ輜重等隊属ノ補給機関ハ未ダ揚陸途中ニアルヲ以テ、軍隊直接ノ補給ニハ主トシテ地方小舟ヲ徴用シテ、「クリーク」往来ニヨリ、概ネ大行李、輜重ノ代用ヲツトメツツアリ。
馬糧ノ追送ハ容積ノ関係上頗ル困難トシツツモ、現地ニオケル刈取ノ稲ヲ利用シ、又小麦等ヲ加ヘ殆ンド内地ニ見ル給飼ヲ実施シアルモ、今日迄ニオイテ、栄養上ニハ支障ナキモノト認メアリ。
被服ニ関シテハ、鹵獲セル靴下、綿入、朋衣等ヲ支給シ、概ネ給養上遺憾ナカラシメアリ。
衛 生
衛生状態ハ概シテ良好ニシテ、将兵ノ健康度ハ逐次気候風土ニ慣馴シ、増強シツツアルヲ認ム、コノ地上陸以来ノ戦死総計一九二(内将校一四)、戦傷五六九(内将校二三)、平病二〇〇ニシテ、疾病者ハ迅速ニ衛生機関ニ収容セシメ、初療ノ普及ニ遺憾ナキヲ期シアリ。(以下略)
第十六師団に限らず、上陸後引続いて追撃作戦に移った当初は、各師団の追撃隊は、補給・給養が意の如くならず、現地物資によったのであるが、南京攻略当時(12月10日以後)は後方兵站も漸く追随していた。

したがって、将兵が飢えのあまり掠奪を行うような状態にはなかったのである。
<次号へ続く>

Friday, February 19, 2010

Shigemitsu Mamoru - A brave diplomat and Class A war criminal

Shigemitsu Mamoru (the man with a hat and a stick) was standing on battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay (September, 1945) to sign the surrender, as a representative of Japanese government.  He carried a stick because he lost his right leg by a bomb thrown by a Korean terrorist in Shanghai.  Standing right was General Umezu, who represented Imperial Japanese Army.  Shigemitsu describes the fact that the Americans demanded signatures from both government and military as a symbol of out of control military, the fact recognized even by the Americans.
 
 Shigemitsu signs the surrender on the battleship.


The book I refereed to, 昭和の動乱, is a best history book of Japan during 1920-1945 period.  The book gives a reasonable narrative to the situation spiraling into a catastrophic war. This might be the English translation.  He was a British style liberal diplomat and an important player during the war time.  He was later arrested as a class A war criminal because a Soviet prosecutor insisted that his handling of border crash between Korea and Soviet (battle of Lake Khasan) is an act of aggression.  Shigemitsu was not a military commander, but an ambassador to Soviet at the time who was trying to establish cease fire.  Nevertheless, he was arrested and later convicted as a class A war criminal.  Why this was possible was beyond normal understanding, except that the tribunal was a political show.  Seven year imprisonment sentence were later shortened to four year and seven months.  He wrote this book during that prison time.  After independence, he was active as a politician and became a minister of foreign affairs in Hatoyama Ichiro cabinet (the grandfather of Hatoyama Yukio). 

Shigemitsu negotiated with Soviets to reopen the diplomatic relationship between the two countries.  This was necessary for Japan to join UN, because Soviets, as a permanent member of security counsel, vetoing the motion.  The negotiation was finalized by Hatoyama.  The diplomatic relationship enabled the repatriation of 500,000 Japanese captives who were enslaved in glags in Siberia by Soviets, who simply broke the non-aggression treaty to grab anything and anybody they could.  100,000 perished before they could come back home.  Shigemitsu gave acceptance speech when Japan joined UN in 1956, and one month later he died.

Shigemitsu defines the irresponsible behavior of Imperial Japanese Army and Navy as a consequence of the flaw in Meiji Constitution, which gave the emperor, not the government, the power to control the armed forces.  Since the emperor (Hirohito) did not give orders and stayed away from the politics, Army and Navy bureaucrats used this as a foundation to do whatever they wanted, and war plan was haphazardly created by a small group of people outside the control of government.  In addition to the division between the government and military, Army and Navy were divided. The situation was different when Japan fought Sino-Japanese war, as evidenced by 褰々録 written by Mutsu Munemitsu.  Then primer minister, Ito Hirobumi, had a total control of the military at that time.  It is ironic that Constitution written by Ito himself produced the devastating results decades later, when all the Meiji revolutionaries died out.  The last one, Saionji Kimmochi died one year before the Pearl Harbor attack.

Some criticize Yasukuni shrine because class A war criminals are enshrined.  Then I wonder if they know Shigemitsu Mamoru.  He was not killed, so he is not enshrined. He was convicted but he has nothing to be ashamed of.  Sometimes I also think of lieutenant general Okada Tasuku, who was tried and sentenced to death by hanging at Yokohama class BC tribunal.  Okada Tasuku sentenced to death US pilots of B29 bombers who did carpet bombing of Nagoya.  His logic was that they were captured as war criminals, not prisoners of war who have legal protection, because carpet bombing targeting civilians is violation of international law.  He maintained his argument in Yokohama tribunal, took all the responsibility, and accepted the death sentence as a matter of fact.  For Okada Tasuku, the court was simply an extension of military defense in a legal form.  That was why he kept on protecting his men.  After his death sentence, even his prosecutor submitted a plea to save his life.  He was killed on Sept 17, 1949.

Thursday, February 18, 2010

Global trends before and affter the war

 apple407 wrote:
Your research and scholarship is impressive. But, I feel you remain too focussed on your (impressive) details that you fail to brush in the larger global picture for the cause of so-called Japanese war of aggression: African continent-colonized by Europe; India-colonized by Britain; China-about to be colonized; South-east Asian zone variously owned by european interests; not to omit Russian expansionist intentions in Mongolia and in China and in the middle east.

Didn’t these wider global trends instruct Japan in its own survival strategies?

You are talking about a world view from a corner of Asia sill remaining to be colonized at the beginning of 20th century.  You forgot to add the expansion of USA from the East.  It is symbolic that Japan's modernization began from the direct threat by US gunships in Tokyo Bay led by Commodore Perry.  Togo Heihachiro, the captain of battle ship Naniwa and the commander of the battle of Sea of Japan during Russo-Japanese war, was sent to pressure the coup of Hawaii, but the weak island nation was colonized in no time by US in front of the eyes of Japan.  US and Japan started to crash over the interests in Manchuria and Manchurian railways.

I agree with your premise that the global trends shaped the strategy of Japan at the time, but two things happened since then.  First, Japan lost concrete strategies as to what to build, some time between Manchuria incident (1931) and the second battle of Shanghai (1937).  Second, UK and US began to shape a new narrative of a world view with Atlantic charter and the foundation of UN.  The global trends changed.

The second battle of Shanghai (1937) was a deliberate aggression to international concession by Nationalist Party (KMT) with a help of Nazi Germany.  Japan should have abandoned the interests in Shanghai for long term security reasons.  Actually, Ishihara Kanji, the architect of Manchurian Empire, maintained that Japan should concentrate the efforts in building Manchuria, and defense, not offense.  Instead, Japan chose to send Army, which was followed by the fall of Nanjing, collapse of the KMT government there, and the endless and aimless war in China with numerous casualties.  After this wrong decision, I do not think the leaders knew what they were doing.

Second, UK and US formed a new political vision, which is still dominant to this day.  The Atlantic charter declares anti-colonialism, which showed the major colonial powers, UK and US, abandoned the future expansionist approach, at least publicly.  This is brilliant because this absolves any colonization or aggrandizement of their own in the past.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;
This undermined the validity of anti-colonialism of Japan. As a political counteraction, Japan promoted East Asian Prosperity Sphere, multi-ethnic regional community.  In a sense, official discourse in Japan was more multi-ethnic in prewar era than after the war.  For example, the war time slogan 一億火の玉 (one hundred million as a fireball) meant 80 million Japanese and 20 million Koreans.  "Japanese as a single race" or "insular mentality" was a postwar invention. 

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the objector securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;
The opposites of these three (freedom of trade (even to the vanquished), freedom of high seas and economic advancement) were the real cause of Japanese expansion to Manchuria.  The reaction to Great Depression and blockade of trade militarized major powers and nurtured totalitarian ideas.  Actually, in 1930s, totalitarian politics looked much rosier as it does now.  Soviets, Nazis and Roosevelt eternal regime all seemed recovering miraculously from the economic predicament, and they were building up their military in a incredible speed.

As history tells, since Japan lost the war, the Japanese version of the narrative did not prevail.  However, the Japanese invasion wiped out all colonial governments, in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Burma, Philippine, Burma in a very short period.   Even though Philippine was re-invaded by US, Malaysia and Hong Kong by UK, Viet Nam and Cambodia by France, Indonesia by Holland, all of them could not last long.  Free trade was established making it unnecessary to set up market colonies by force.  Abandoning Manchuria, Taiwan and Korea made the defense of Japan very simple.  Japan no longer had to carry the burden of defending Korea and now US did.  Japan did not have to face Soviet invasion into Inner Mongolia (e.g. Nomonhan incident). US paid a high price in defending South Korea, and had to face Soviets, whom US had been giving aid all along.  Ironically, Japan obtained two aims of the war, anti-colonialism and free trade, by losing the war.  Both of these two ideas were good for Japan from the beginning.

Back to the Korean issue.
The new political narrative has a ethic/judgmental component in it, something similar to guilt by association game: Nazi Germany - evil - ethnic cleansing - aggressor.  Korean version replaces "Nazi Germany" with "Japan." This new pattern of association is considered to be proven because Japan lost the war. 

However, there are some flaws in this logic.
First, if the defeat is the proof of righteousness, then making Korea a protectorate of Japan was also a righteous conclusion of Korea's defeat.  In this case, they were defeated even before the possibility of war.
Second, there is no "ethnic cleansing" counterpart in Japan.  Japan might have xenophobia but this is equal opportunity xenophobia, and not even remotely resembles antisemitism.  Japan did not oppress white Russian Jews in Manchuria.  There were many Polish Jews fled from Lithuania with transit visas to Japan. This is done by a Japanese diplomat of Kanaus, Sugihara Chiune.
Therefore, they have to make up the ethnic cleansing of Koreans during the Japanese administration of Korea, which are far from reality if you check the details one by one.  Unfortunately or fortunately, Japan did not have concentration camps in Korea, or total control districts, in which North Korea put 100,000 inmates to maintain their Chuch'e style police state. 

Wednesday, February 17, 2010

Haraguchi Kazuhiro decided to fight back

 According to Nikkei, Haraguchi decided to fight back CHIKEN.  This sounds like coordinated effort with Suzuki  Muneo.  This is what exactly DPJ should do.  This is what we call "match pump."  Stir up the fire and extinguish it.

検察などの裏金存在調査を指示 総務相

原口一博総務相は17日、検察庁を含むすべての行政機関の「裏金」の存在を調べるよう省内に指示したことを明らかにした。各省庁の業務の実施状況を調べ る行政評価局を活用する。「検察に裏金があるとの告発もあった。すべての機関について例外なく検査してくれということだ」とも述べた。総務省内で記者団に 語った。
新党大地の鈴木宗男衆院議員が1月19日に提出した質問主意書で、検察庁の調査活動費が裏金として飲食費などに流用されたとする一部報道の事実関係を質 問。政府は29日に閣議決定した答弁書で「調査活動費は適正に執行されている。調査をする必要はない」と回答した。
総務相は「新政権になって今までのアカを流さないといけない。調査はきちんとやる」と強調した。(07:00)
 This has a background story.  A prosecutor of Osaka Koken, Mitsui Tamaki was arrested  in 2002 on minor charges and he was convicted and jailed later.  The arrest was made on the same day, just hours before he was scheduled to be interviewed by a journalist and TV caster, Torigoe Shuntaro, regarding the illegal embezzlement of "investigation fund" inside the prosecutor's office.  The series of abnormal events at the Osaka local court, such as leak of the sentence before the official judgment, gave an impression that prosecutor's office and the court are all in it together.

Since Suzuki Muneo's arrest and ever-lasting trial also took abnormal path  (in his case, by Tokyo CHIKEN, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office), it is natural that he has deep-rooted grudge against CHIKEN. He has been publicly and openly criticizing CHIKEN for a long time.


We will see the developments soon.

Mitsui Tamaki Just got out of jail this January after 15 months, and there will be a symposium regarding Ozawa on Feb 26, streamed on internet.

Tuesday, February 16, 2010

Three reasons why modern history is lost in Japan

 I think where Japan gets this wrong is by not educating the younger generations of what happened between 1900 and 1945. All Japanese know of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but little else.

There are three aspects to the lack of modern history teaching in Japan.

First, Japanese education is not focused on injecting hatred.  For example, as Nick says, every student in Japan knows Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  But the education does not stretch to the fact that mass bombing aiming massacre of civilians are war crimes which requires punishment.  If this is just like Korean style education (North and South), Japanese students will be crammed with hatred against the war crimes committed by Americans and there will be suicide bombers in Washington.  However, that does not happen in Japan.  Students in Japan were not told that ROK invaded Takeshima during the occupation era, when US was responsible for the defense of Japan.  Again, Japan does not stress retaliation or use of force.  What Japan does is to endlessly persuade ROK to settle the issue in International Court, which ROK refuses every year.  You might prefer Korean style indoctrination of hate.  In Japan, thought-police style education is not generally liked.

Second, the real black box of history teaching in Japan is 1955-2009, LDP era.  Thanks to GHQ, most of important prewar documents were disclosed.  Under LDP one party rule, critical information has been kept secret, while SPJ/SDP maintained the other side of fantasy.  There is no adequate freedom of information act yet, and even though DPJ is trying (Okinawa and nuclear bombs), the effort is hardly it systematic.  For example, Kantei Kimitsuhi (secret discretionary budget) has been suspected to be used for political purposes for a long time, but DPJ (Hirano Hirofumi, to be exact) has no intention of pursuing the secret.  There are numerous issues still to be disclosed: Did CIA illegally fund Kishi Nobusuke (Most likely so, according to US side documents); Did Nakasone Yasuhiro receive money from Boeing when JSDF purchased P3C? (the other side of Rockheed corruption involving Tanaka Kakuei).  Without basic records, the consistent narrative is very difficult. 

Third, There are fundamental flaws in Constitution. The Article 9 of Constitution says no military is allowed, and Japan has JSDF.  Historically speaking, IJA was totally destroyed at first.  New Constitution was written by GHQ, and ratified by general vote under US occupation.  At that point, there was no military.  The government was maintaining that Japan was not allowed to have military.  But soon the Korean War was started by DPRK, and JSDF was re-established.  Then the government changed the interpretation, and now claimed that JSDF was not military because equipments were not powerful enough to be called military equipments.  Then Japan regained sovereign power, which came with San Francisco Treaty and US-Japan security treaty.  All these years, Supreme Court avoided any meaningful judgement regarding JSDF and US-Japan security treaty.  That rendered a division of cabinet (Naikaku Houseikyoku) a de facto interpreter of Constitution, which has no such constitutional power.    Constitution defines Supreme Court as supreme, and no special courts are allowed (Article 76 2).  Then, there is no military courts to judge war crimes, which should have different standards than penal code.  At this moment, war crimes have to be tried as regular crimes.  If JSDF has to battle, this would be a real legal chaos.  What kind of rational narrative is possible?

New Supreme Court appointees are subjected to general vote of confirmation, which has never fired anybody or never will (Article 79 2).  Article 89 says that tax money should not be spent on non-public or religious schools, which is totally ignored.  Actually, nobody knows or cares. 

All these come from Article 96 1, which requires 2/3 super majority of both houses to propose amendments, which has never been done.   As Ozawa Ichiro says, without changing Article 96 1, there would be no amendments.

Saturday, February 13, 2010

What is the basis of anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea?

This is the fifth piece of my rebuttal to Tobias Harris's post.

Then what is different in South Korea (Republic of Korea)?

First, ROK needed an emotional narrative of the foundation of a state.
ROK did not fought for independence. Independence was a free gift from USA.
On the other hand, in Taiwan, since KMT won the war (even though they lost the civil war), they did not need to fabricate the history. Every nation has to create or fake a history and authenticity of the regime, if they do not have it already. As King George was called the absolute tyrant in USA (the declaration of independence is filled with resentment towards the king, occupying two thirds of the space), the previous ruler should be vilified. This gave the political momentum to the anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea. The situation in North Korea is similar if one replaces USA with USSR and add USA to bad bad Japan. To secure the authenticity, ROK governments used educational system to reinforce the narrative. However, if they go outside the political arena, they are not so anti-Japanese. For example, ROK still bans Japanese Manga comics on the political surface, but it is widely pirated and accepted by many in real life. Some even believe Doraemon is Korean. Banning Japanese culture might be an excuse to massively pirate Japanese Manga. Although anti-Japanese sentiment was widely advertised, many South Koreans visits Japan and some simply stay. This type of emotional reaction will decrease as the society matures, because democratic election will build the necessary authenticity gradually. Okada Katsuya could apologize for hurting the Korean pride, but that does not change anything. Perhaps, "matter of fact"ly attitude is the only important aspect of it. I do not think narcissistic view does any good to ROK, but Japan should refrain from politicizing the futile topic.

Second, traditional Sino-centric world view created prejudice.
In North East Asia, China was THE superpower. Japan successfully prevented two Chinese invasion in 7th and 13th century (Tang dynasty and Mongolian dynasty). Korea was not so fortunate because they did not have Sea of Japan. Korea was subjugated by Chinese empires, one after another for two thousand years. This is why Korea ended up having the world view that China is first, Korea is second, and Japan should be beneath. Unfortunately, the Japanese rule totally contradicted this world view. If the physical wound is the cause of the resentment, as Tobias says, millions of death caused by Chinese military intervention during the Korean war should be more serious and fresh. However, ROK government did not demand apology when they established their diplomatic relationship. Apology is not even a topic because China will laugh at their face. This asymmetric attitude comes from the skewed Sino-centric view: China is the ruler and they have their way. Since 1635 when the emperor of Qing dynasty conquered defiant Korea and made them build a monument honoring the generosity of the emperor himself, for 250 years Korea was paying respect, money, women to the Qing emperors. The independence gate in Seul was built after Japan expelled Chinese influence from Korea by Sino-Japanese war. But nowadays, Koreans in Seoul falsely believe that the independence gate is meant for independence from Japan, which is not. This is not "love of their country" like Tobias says. This is loving the stronger power. By the way, China in Chinese (中華) means "center, flourish".

Many people might know that ROK has been claiming that Imperial Japan changed the name of East Sea into Sea of Japan. This I think is the silliest international dispute, but they do not think so. It is as if they think name defines the ownership of the sea. If that is the case, USA would have renamed Mexican Gulf several times over. Historically speaking, Sea of Japan was established after Russian and Japanese geologists explored northern periphery of the sea and defined the area. Without Japanese archipelago, Sea of Japan is Pacific Ocean. For this reason, Europeans named the sea Sea of Japan. If Japan names the sea, it could have been Korean Sea or North Sea because those are the landmarks that defines the sea viewed from the Japanese side of the sea.

My point is, Koreans call Yellow Sea as West Sea. Chinese simply laugh at them and correctly point out that Yellow Sea is Yellow Sea, and "East Sea" is west of Japan.

24.この2年でいろいろと思い通りになったあなたがたは、中国に「日本海」を「東海」と表記するよう求めています。しかしこれは全くもって噴飯もの。あ なたがたに教えて差し上げましょう。「日本海」というのはこれまで慣習として呼ばれてきたもので、「日本の海」という意味ではありません。インド洋、アラ ビア海、ベンガル湾然り、皆その国に属してませんよね。
日本の国の面積と人口はあなたの国より遙かに多く、数百年という欧米との交流の歴史をも ち、国力も強大がため、この海域が日本海と称されるのは必然的な要因があったのです。
それに日本はその片側半分をこの海域に浸しています。その長 さから見ても論拠には充分で、あなたがたが「東海」と呼ぶ海域は、日本からみれば「西海」ではありませんか。
中国では古来、この海域を「青海」も しくは「鯨海」と称していました。唐代の渤海は現在のウラジオストックから日本海をまたぎ、十数回と渤海使を派遣して日本と交流をおこなっていたのです。 このときに中国はこの海域を「日本海」と呼んでいます。精巧で美しい海図と多くの文献が残されています。古地図を展示するのが大好きなあなたがたがまさか それを知らない筈はないでしょう。

25.あなたがたは60年代あたりから、黄海をこっそりと「西海」に改めるよう国際社会に働きかけてい ますよね。いまではあなたがたの国の出版社はすべて黄海を「西海」と表記しています。でも無駄です。英語読みで黄海は「Yellow Sea」。黄海は永遠に黄海です。


Third, Korean history does not relate to real history.
South Korea almost abandoned Chinese characters. (North Korea abandoned Chinese characters completely and uses only Hangul now.) This is a serious problem because all history documents before the Japanese era are completely written in Chinese characters. Hangul, the phonetic letters, were not for official use before then. Even the first communication between Meiji Japan and Korea (Li dynasty) was written in Chinese. When 袁世凱 interrogated 大院君, the father of 高宗, the communication between the two was written Chinese. The records during the Japanese era are written in Japanese with massive Chinese characters. Therefore, younger generations in South Korea have no basic skills to read the historical records other than what is written in Hangul. This makes Korean history education into Orwellian form: students cannot verify the original source or do they care at all? Koreans are now claiming they have 5,000 years of history.

The first history book in Korea 三国史記 (history of three nations, meaning three Koreas) was written in 12th century, 500 years after the Japanese one. Chinese wrote the first history book 史記 in 1st century BC. All historical records of Korea before 12th century relies either Chinese or Japanese records, as if they were not important at all to Koreans. Hangul was created in 15th century. Nothing was written in Hangul before then, and everything was written in Chinese. Japanese phonetic alphabets, the counterpart of Hangul, were established in 8th century. 三国史記 places beginning of Korea at right after the occupation by 武帝 of Han dynasty (1st century AD). Since Chinese have all the documentation, 三国史記 could not fake the history before that, but at least the author read and knew the Chinese documents. Japanese were again fortunate (?) in that sense, because in the first two history books written in 7th century, they could place the origin of Japan (and the emperor) in 7th century BC.

The Orwellian system could be found in the purest form in North Korea, because they completely abolished Chinese characters. They can create and recreate the history as they wish and as often as they like. Now, Kim Jong Il was born in mountain shack in North Korea, when actually he was born in Russia under the protection of Soviets.

For these reasons, past history means something different from the actual history in South Korea, which is reinforced through their educational system motivated by political agenda and their fear for identity. This situation makes politics of history completely futile. Therefore, Japan should leave history to historians and direct things to more pragmatic aspects.

Taiwan does not hold grudge against Japan

This is the fourth piece of my rebuttal to Tobias Harris's post.

The first thing that comes to my mind was Taiwan when I read Tobias's idea that the brutal reign created everlasting resentment, Taiwan was under Japanese administration for 50 years, which is more than several generations. Korea was 35 years. Generally speaking, the Taiwanese are pro-Japanese. Millions of Taiwanese, young and old, come, visit and enjoy Japan. Former Taiwanese President Lee studied at Kyoto University, and served in Imperial Japanese Army. His brother was killed in the war and enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine, where President Lee pays his respect to the memories of his fallen brother. There are many fans of President Lee in Japan, even though he is a political enemy of PRC.

Why are the Taiwanese so sympathetic to the Japanese? Taiwan was re-invaded by the mainland Chinese Nationalist Party (国民党 Kuo Ming Tang) after the war. Starting from chaotic slaughter of the 28,000 Taiwanese on 2.28 incident (1947), Generalissimo Chang Kai Shek 蒋介石 governed the island much more brutally than the Japanese. For four decades since then, Taiwan had been under military rule of Generalissimo and KMT mainlanders. For the Taiwanese like President Lee, it would not have been difficult to find better points in Japanese administration.

During that time, Taiwan gradually lost international presence. They lost the permanent seat in the security council of UN. Many countries, including USA and Japan, abandoned diplomatic relationship with Taiwan and chose People's Republic of China instead. In short, Taiwanese locals emotionally valued Japanese era, which was much better than KMT days, and they need Japan (and US military presence in Japan) for their security against growing threatening gigantic PRC.

The Taiwanese have two reasons: the Japanese administration was benign when compared to the military regime of KMT, and they need Japan for their fragile security environment.

Japanese annexation of Korea is the same as USA's colonization of Philippine

This is the third piece of my rebuttal to Tobias Harris's post.

Tobias compares Japanese annexation of Korea (1905 protectorate, 1910 annexation) with British annexation of Ireland. In my opinion, closer example should be USA's annexation of Hawaii in 1898. Or rather, USA's annexation of Philippine after the Philippine-American war (1899-1902). Actually, around the time of the annexation, USA was a good imperial friend of Japan. USA recognized Japanese superiority over Korea in exchange of Japanese recognition of USA's annexation of Philippine. This is evidenced by the Katsura-Tuft agreement on Sept 27, 1905. If I infer from Tobias's characterization, should USA keep apologizing to Philippine? Or has USA ever apologized at all? In other words, does it improve the relationship between the two countries? If one looks at the current situations in South Korea and in Taiwan, and compare them with Philippine, I think it is obvious which annexation left better influence.

(My translation of the whole text of the agreement between Katsura and Tuft.)

Firstly, some of pro-Russian Americans insist that this victory of Japan over Russia will be the first stage of Philippine invasion by Japan. However, Secretary Tuft believes that the only concern of Japan towards Philippine is that the island should be governed by strong and friendly USA. Count Katsura firmly affirmed Tuft's observation, and assured that Japan has no intention of invading Philippine at all.

Secondly, Count Katsura stated that the primary principle of Japanese diplomatic policy is to sustain overall peace in Far East. Therefore, in order to achieve that goal, the only practical method is to accomplish a good agreement among Japanese, American and British governments.

Thirdly, Count Katsura said that since Korea is the direct cause of the war between Japan and Russia, the logical conclusion of the war should be the complete and final solution of the Peninsula issue, which has the absolute importance to Japan.

If Korea were left alone, Korea would sign inconsiderate agreements or treaties with foreign countries, as she has been doing, which would certainly reproduce international conflicts which existed before the war.

Considering these situations, Japan thinks that Japan has to take serious options to prohibit Korea from returning to the previous situation, and from forcing Japan to fight war with foreign countries again.

Secretary Tuft agreed on the Count Katsura's view and expressed, as his personal opinions, that it is the logical conclusion of the war that Japan provide protective governance of Korea, which requires Korea to acquire the agreement of Japan before Korea signs treaties with foreign countries, and that this will sustain the eternal peace over the East.

Secretary Tuft said that he does not have the right to confirm his opinions, but according to him, President Roosevelt will surely agree with him.

===

Roosevelt telegraphed Tuft, saying that his opinions is correct in all aspects and that Tuft should convey the message to Count Katsura that his opinion is the words of the President. (Sept 31, 1905)

Japan did not Japanize Korean names

This is the second piece of my rebuttal to Tobias Harris's post.

Japan did not force Koreans to Japanize their Korean names. Japan forced them to use "Japanese style family name system" instead of "Confucian style paternal clan name system". The issue was how to adjust civil laws to the reality at the time with increasing intermarriage.

Japan had already established family registration system to certify birth and death, and rights and duties arising from the kinship, such as inheritance and protection. Modern Japanese family system is not Confucian, meaning that family has a single family name 氏 as that of the head of the family. Family names of children 氏 in the household is automatically the same as the name of the family. This means when two people (usually with different family names) marry, one of the two has to change their family name 氏 to that of the other. The new family name can be maternal or paternal. There is no taboo in marrying a person with the same name 氏, unless they are directly related.

In Confucian system (Korea and China), women do not share their "last name 姓 (which comes first in North East Asia)" with other member of the same family. Names of children 姓 are inherited from the father, so this is paternalistic. The name does not belong to the family, but to the paternal clan. Korean system added the origin of the clan 本貫 to their clan name 姓. There is a taboo in marrying a person with the same clan name 姓 and the same origin 本貫. On the other hand, it is a taboo to adopt a child of a different clan name 姓 or a different origin 本貫. Even when the child belongs to the same clan, it is not permissible to adopt them if the generation order is higher than their future parents in law. This makes it almost impossible to adopt an orphan. As a result international adoption of Korean orphans, as found after the mayhem of Korean war, were much more than Japanese, because in Japan, there is no such restriction.

Aristocratic class (貴族, 両班 Yanban) of Korean people keep 族譜 Jogbo, a family tree book. As a logical conclusion of the paternalistic idea, women are often listed as "women", since they were irrelevant. Others, regular people 中人/常民, or slaves, untouchables, Buddhist priests (白丁/奴婢/倡優/僧侶/駅人) did not belong to Jogbo system. Slaves and untouchables did not have their clan name at all, and they had to respect and obey the aristocrats and upper class.

This Confucius clan name is deeply connected to their religious belief of ancestral worship, since Clan defines the ancestor. It is also deeply connected to the discrimination and caste and out-caste system with magical thinking. How these outcasts had their own place or how women were confined in their own residence can be found in the book of Isabella Bird.

The modernization by Japan is to destroy this archaic system and organize each national into functional members of a family devoid of historical dirty color. A slave 白丁 who was brutally exploited by Yanban 両班 for no other reason than that they were born in that class can now be a soldier or worker. This is why many people from oppressed Chejudo island found their home in Osaka. This is a radical idea, but perhaps this is the only method Japan knew at the time to modernize and militarize a country in Asia, including Japan herself. Obviously the radical reform was opposed by those who have and those who hold the Confucian feeling. Nobody admits they were slaves 白丁, and everybody behaves as if they were from the upper class Yanban 両班, if you ask them. This makes the opposition to the reform politically correct. All Koreans could unite if Japanization of the names were the issue.

The whole point of the reform was to destroy the medieval system. One could say that Japan is guilty of changing the system modern, but not of changing Korean sounding names into Japanese sounding ones. I have other reasons why I think Koreans were not forced to Japanize their names. Many old time Korean residents in Japan use Japanized names, but most Chinese old timers use Chinese name, suggesting that Koreans changed their name as they thought fit. For example, 張本勲 (real name 張 勲) is Korean, 王貞治 (his real name) is Chinese, both are renowned baseball players. Korean residents in Japan use their Japanized name even among themselves, when they were not obviously forced by the Japanese. For example, Shin Sugok 辛淑玉, a famous Korean activist said:

在日の1月1日は日本のような正月をせず、「ミョンジョル(名節)」という法事のようなことをするので、大晦日はおじいさん、 おばあさんの家に行って女の子が台所で準備をします。その時、おじいさんが「節子(私の日本名)、来い」と呼ぶのです。

In this case, her grandfather called her Setsuko, her Japanized name, not Sugok.

She also writes in her autobiographical book:
何度か、母は私の首を絞めた。
 「節子、一緒に死のう」と言う。
 私は、死ぬのは嫌だったけど、いつも「うん」と答えた。
 母があまりにも可哀想だった。
 母が死んだら私も生きていけないと思った。
 だから、一度も抵抗しなかった。
 何度も首を絞められたが、最後まで締め続けることはなかった。
 もうろうとなった意識の中で、母の泣き声だけが聞こえていた。
 父も母も、泣いてばかりいた。
(辛淑玉著『鬼哭啾啾(きこくしゅうしゅう)——「楽園」に帰還した私の家族』解放出版社、2003年、初版、p.46)

In this case, her mother called her Setsuko, not Sugok, at this most intimate moment when she was strangling her daughter.

Under Japanese administration, 90 % of Koreans Japanized their name, but in Taiwan, the number remained several percent. Some prominent Koreans used their Korean names any way. The one and only Korean congressman in prewar Tokyo used his Korean name (朴春琴). A lieutenant general executed as a class B war criminal also had a Korean name (洪思翊). Or other military men (白洪錫,金錫源).

Why Taiwanese did not Japanize their names, while Koreans did? Of course there could be numerous individual reasons. Traditional 事大主義 (respect of the powerful) could be one of them. Because of the geological reasons, Chinese influence over Korea runs deep. Korea has been given brutal lessons from China since the conquest by 武帝 of 前漢, Han dynasty, in 1st century AD. Currently, almost all Korean names are Chinese, but before 7th century, there are many records of non-Chinese names, which are long gone now. They changed their names so that they could belong to the powerful and the upper class. When Korea was conquered by Mongols, Korean kings had Mongolian names too. If the Japanese reign were longer enough, I think all Chinese names that Koreans use would have disappeared as they did in 7th century.